Ticket mobilis funiculaire Montmartre

Salut des khey de Paris pour me dire si je peut prendre le funiculaire à Montmartre avec un ticket mobilis svp

Personne. Les soit disant parisiens du 18-25 sont en réalité des banlieusard ou quoi.

Oui tu peux. Et si ça marche pas, fraude. Des controleurs dans le funiculaire

November 11, 2000, tragedy happened at the Alpine village of Kaprun when his funiculair caught fire. It had 161 passengers. it was supposed to get them to the slopes of Kitzsteinhorn. It was on 9 am. The trip shouldn't make it more than 10 minutes but instead in the funnel, it caught fire. 20 minutes after it disappeared in the tunnel, clouds of thick black smoke were billowing out of the tunnel's upper end into the Alpicenter station. Ultimatly 12 passengers defied their instincts to escape the fire. An accident that was caused by a deadly detail. The possibility of a fire breaking out in the tunnel was close to 0. Never in the Austrian cableway there was an accident like this. Nothing apparently in the tunnel or funicular incited the blaze. The Gletschernahn funicular had no engine, fuel tanks, or other part of standard railway. Using steel cables, 2 trains travelling in opposite directions are hauled by a powerful motorized winch system. Austria had 12 of these railways. This Kaprun one was built in 1974 and modernized in 1993. The single track was 3 900 meters long, of which 3 300 meters were on the tunnel. When 2 trains go to opposite directions, they bypass each other in the passing loop. Both trains comprised 2 carriages with weight compartiments accomodating up to 180 passengers. 2 cabins were positionned on either side for conductors responsible for opening and closing the doors. Most of the guests caught in that accident are used to this and travelled with the funicular many times before. Thomas Kraus, a passenger in the rearmost compartiment was the first to notice something. After only 20 meters up the track he saw control dashboard smoking in the empty conductor cabin behind him. As the train kept ascending, the smoke became more intense and then appeared in the passenger compartiment. The anxiety turned into panic when the train entered the tunnel. The passengers banged on compartiment walls. There was no way to alert the conductor in the cabin on the other end of the train. The funicular was not equipped with fire alarms, intercom systems or emergency brakes. One passenger tried to use his mobil phone to call the service station. But there was no signal inside the tunnel. The train kept going deeper inside the tunnel. The fire broke out and spread across tha vacant conductor's cabin at the back. 600 meters inside the tunnel, the trian stopped. The passengers assumed the conductor spotted the fire and stopped to evacuate but it was not the case. The conductor was confused about the train coming to an halt and the conductor didn't open the doors. The spreading fire burned the lines of the hydrualic brake system which engaged the brakes automatically. The system desigend th prevent the disaster paradoxically put the passengers into a deadly trap. The passengers in the rearmost compartiment started for a way out. But no way to open doors. Erwin Goetz, a buidler, started to hit windows with aki pole but windows were made of break resistant acrylic material. He hit as hard as he could and managed finally to make a crack in the window. But Goetz discovered another layer of acrylic glass. Several passengers already apssed out after inhaling smoke. Eventually the window broke and people started to escape the burning train. After 4 minutes the conductor finally realized what happened and called service station. He was instructed to open doors but after that, the connection was lost. The hydraulic system for opening the doors also failed. It was a matter of time ebfore the fire engulfed the whole train. Luckily the conductor was calm enough to leave his cabin and engage the door's manual lock. A moment of relief. If passengers didn't make one mistake, worse disaster could have been avoided. In the pitch black darkness with ski shoes on, the passengers tried to move away from the fire so they climbed uphill. As they struggled to move through the tunnel, they didn't notice that all the smoke was going into the direction. Kaprun's tunnel 30 degrees steep angle created a chimney effect which caused all the heat and smoke to travel upwards. None of the passengers going up survived. Too many smoke and carbon monoxyde. The majority didn't make it more than 15 meters off the train. A group of 12 passagers from the rearmost compartiment escaped the inferno because Thorsten Graedler, one of the passenger, was a volunteer firefighter. " I know fireplaces. When you open the flue, the fire shoots upwards, so you have to go down. " Hold each other's hands, believe me, we have to go down. " The passed the burning conductor's cabin and reached the smoke free zone below the train. But the agony didn't end for the group. They had to cross 600 meters of track inside the funnel. With the fire raging there was a risk that the haulage cable might snap and send the train down on them. But it didn't happen. The remaining 150 people including the conductor died from suffocation from headinw upwards. But 5 more people died because inside the twin train coming in the opposite direction, there were 2 people, a conductor and a passenger. Both didn't escape. The smoke spread and reached the Alpicenter of the summit here the staff tried to recover the power. They raised the alarm inside the station upon seeing the smoke. To save their lives, the employees left the emergency door wide open, increasing the chimney effect in the tunnel. 500 firefighters, 22 helicopters and 100 rescue vehicles came here. 4 staff members were left inside, unconscious because of the smoke. The firefighters took them out but 3 of them died. Most of casualties were tourists from Austria and Germany. Other were from USA, Japan, Czech, UK, Netherlands and Slovenia. Among the victime there was the world champion freestyle skier Sandra Schmidt. and seven time olympic medalist Josef Schaupper. 4 days after the accident, the examining judge of Salzburg court appointed Anthon Muhr to investigate it. Ministry of interior sent an unit from the KTZ forensic center to investigate. But the subject of investigation has brunt entirely. So they used the twin train to determine the source of the fire. They based their research on Thomas Kraus's testimonywho came that the smoke came from the dashboard at the conductor's cabin at the rear end of the train. Upon inspection it was determined that the only item who could have caused fire was was a cabin space heater. No one considered that such an irrevelant installation could end up burning out the entire train. The twin train's heater was taken to KTZ laboratories in Vienna. The investigators discovered that the heater's heating element was the fire's most likely source. They believed that it came loose, made contact with the plasting housing, and ignited it. The fire slowly spread, led by flammable materials inside the desk. It ate into the lines of the 42 US Gallon ( 160I ) hydraulic system which eventually burst. The released oil and rubber flooring fueled the blaze that spread across the cabin and later, the entire train. The fan was installed in 1993 when funicular became subjected to modernization. Salzburg public prosecutor Eva Danninger Soriat used reports filled by both Muhr and the KTZ to build the indictement against 16 people. 3 managers from Gletschenbahnen Kaprun AG, the company in charge of the funicular, 2 managing directors of the Austrian Swoboda Karosserie und Stahlbau GesmhbH that carried out the modernization and installed fan heaters in 1993. 3 employees of the German Mannesmann Rexroth AG who installed the hydraulic lines, 3 officials of the ministry of transport who had issued the railway operatig licence, 2 inspectors from the TUV technical Inspection Association who approved the train and 2 technicians and a builder who installed the emergency door at the Alpicenter. A fan like this is intended for home, not vehicles so it shouldn't have been installed in first place. The proximity of hydraulic lines increased the likehood of fire. In addition, no security features were present on the funicular and the entire design was a major oversight. Trial started in 18th June 2002. Then in 2009, Germany reported on the alleged manipulations of the process by the ministry of Interior and Salzburg Court. The focus was to put on the report and treatment on the expert Anthon Muhr. When he arrived at the scene of investigation he was denied access to the tunnel. When he entered it, investigators from KTZ already took away the evidence. Muhr only received the fan heater in March 2001, 4 months after the accident. The Salzburg court utterly negleted a 50 pages report filled by him. In this report, Muhr noted traces of hydraulic oil in the heater housing. He also foudn traces of the insulating material mineral wool that the Gletscherbahn technicians had used to stuff the cavities between the built in wooden panels. Muhr was finally the one who stressed the proximity of hydraulic lines as an essential factor in the breakout of the fire. During the defense, attorneys made persistent attacks on Muhr. At one point, the court ordered a psychatric examination since he had been diagnosed with depressive syndromes. Rest of experts still engaged in the process, and played down the findings of this report. On February 19th 2004, the process came to an end. Judge Manfred Seiss verdict opened a new chapter of the story. It was foud that the disputed heater had necessary safety marks and was installed following legal standards of the time. Neither Swoboda nor the employees setting the hydraulic lines were aware of its installation. The investigation also found out that no oil leaked from the hydraulic system. The train was sinspected according to the schedule and Aplicenter's emergency. There were no indications or concerns that funicular railway could be dangerous. All sixteen defendants were acquitted of charges. The verdict shocked the prosecutor, families and the Austrian public. Then Gletscherbahnen Kaprun AG directors made a mistake that casted doubts. It seemed the entire trial was an orchestrated cover up. Upon receive acquittal, Gletscherbahnen Kaprun AG's management filled a lawsuit against the disputed heaters manufacturers, the German company Fakir. They didn't however cout on that the prosecutor's office in Salzburg would hand the case over to their colleagues in Germany. Si in November 2005, the Heilbronn Public Prosecutor's office took over and asked the KTI forensic institute of the state criminal investigation office in Stuttgart to renew the investigation. They were determined to do a thourough job. First they requested a fan heater from the twin train to be delivered for examination. When they received it they noted that a fastening dome of the heating element that allegedly let loose was missing. It was a beginning os shocking discoveries by the German investigators. The truth began to unravel. Next they revealed that the heater was disassembled before the installation. The front and the rear part of the heater were taken apart, mounted on a hole in the control panel and fastened back together. it meant that the safety test mask was no longer valid adn that the heater housing was violated and lost protection from liquid dropping in. Following discovery was that while observing the heater, German investigators foudn red liquid residue inside. In the Salzburg court verdict, the judge assumed it was only a reddish condensation. The investigators sent the sample of the liquid to laboratory and it turned out that the red liquid was hydraulic oil. Highly inflammable hydraulic oil that has been banned in aircraft construction for years due to the risk of fire. Conclusion : the hydraulic lines were leaking and the flammable was dropping inside the heater housing. It then came in contact with the heating element and started the fire. Investigators from the KTZ Austrian forensic center delivered a fan from teh twin train with the heating element dent and touching the rear wall. But the element was intact and at safe distance from the plastic back wall. They concluded that during the inspiection, someone manipulated the heating element by bending it toward the rear wall of the housing. They accused their Austrian colleagues of manipulation the evidences. In 2008 they filled charges against 4 Austrian experts for manipulation of evidence. In spring of 2009 it was taken over by the linz office. After 4 months of coordinating teh decision with the responsible ministry, the Linz prosecutor discontinued alll 4 procedures. Gletscherbahnen seem to have bailed out and never recognized their blame for the disaster and tried to compensate financially. But for some of the relatives, that was not enough. A serie of regulations was passed to improve passenger's safety in these railways system. The Kaprun tunnel was sealed after the tragedy.